io.github.viridis-security/injection-detector is an MCP server published by io.github.viridis-security, hosted at mcp.viridis-security.com. When last checked on 2026-11-22 it was working: it answers and lists its tools. It declares 2 tools, including detect_injection, detect_trace_tool_policy.
Formally-verified injection/exfiltration detector for AI agents (MCP-02).
38 connections through 5 shared values. Tap any node.
Inferred from the host name and headers: what a server runs on, not who runs it.
Screen untrusted input for prompt/tool injection, exfiltration, and obfuscation before an agent consumes it. Returns a verdict (clean|suspicious|attack), probability, bits-at-risk (upper bound on adversarial capture per the Adversarial Landauer bound), matched canon patterns, and a recommended action (allow|sanitize|reject|escalate). Backed by Aristotle-verified theorems T-IB-02/T-IB-06/T-IB-01.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| input * | string | The untrusted text/data to screen. |
| agentId | string | Optional: for MCP-01 envelope cross-check. |
| context | string | Optional: the agent's role/system prompt; helps calibrate. |
| certainty | string | Operating point. Default standard. |
None yet. Changes appear after a server's second daily check.
Squares are this server's values; dots are other servers sharing them. A shared address or publisher is a lead, not proof of a common operator.
{
"name": "detect_injection",
"title": "Detect adversarial injection",
"description": "Screen untrusted input for prompt/tool injection, exfiltration, and obfuscation before an agent consumes it. Returns a verdict (clean|suspicious|attack), probability, bits-at-risk (upper bound on adversarial capture per the Adversarial Landauer bound), matched canon patterns, and a recommended action (allow|sanitize|reject|escalate). Backed by Aristotle-verified theorems T-IB-02/T-IB-06/T-IB-01.",
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"input"
],
"properties": {
"input": {
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 200000,
"minLength": 1,
"description": "The untrusted text/data to screen."
},
"agentId": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Optional: for MCP-01 envelope cross-check."
},
"context": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Optional: the agent's role/system prompt; helps calibrate."
},
"certainty": {
"enum": [
"quick",
"standard",
"premium"
],
"type": "string",
"description": "Operating point. Default standard."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
},
"outputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"verdict",
"probability",
"bitsAtRisk",
"recommendedAction"
],
"properties": {
"signals": {
"type": "object"
},
"verdict": {
"enum": [
"clean",
"suspicious",
"attack"
],
"type": "string"
},
"backedBy": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"bitsAtRisk": {
"type": "number"
},
"probability": {
"type": "number"
},
"operatingPoint": {
"type": "object"
},
"matchedPatterns": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"recommendedAction": {
"enum": [
"allow",
"sanitize",
"reject",
"escalate"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explainabilityToken": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
}Analyze an agent trace for the Gray Swan Wave 16 class: untrusted retrieved/tool output causing a tool call outside the user-declared per-turn allowlist. Returns trace counts, unauthorized tool-call evidence, canon mapping VC-AI-TOOL-0001, and claim-boundary guardrails. Backed by T-IB-25/T-IB-29/T-IB-36.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| trace | object | Single agent trace with user_prompt, allowed_tools, and events[]. |
| traces | array | Optional batch of agent traces. |
| targetName | string | Optional display name for the assessed target. |
{
"name": "detect_trace_tool_policy",
"title": "Detect trace tool-policy violations",
"description": "Analyze an agent trace for the Gray Swan Wave 16 class: untrusted retrieved/tool output causing a tool call outside the user-declared per-turn allowlist. Returns trace counts, unauthorized tool-call evidence, canon mapping VC-AI-TOOL-0001, and claim-boundary guardrails. Backed by T-IB-25/T-IB-29/T-IB-36.",
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"trace": {
"type": "object",
"description": "Single agent trace with user_prompt, allowed_tools, and events[].",
"additionalProperties": true
},
"traces": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": true
},
"description": "Optional batch of agent traces."
},
"targetName": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Optional display name for the assessed target."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
},
"outputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"mode",
"verdict",
"recommendedAction",
"summary",
"reviewPriority"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"enum": [
"trace_tool_policy_probe"
],
"type": "string"
},
"traces": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object"
}
},
"canonId": {
"type": "string"
},
"summary": {
"type": "object"
},
"verdict": {
"enum": [
"clean",
"suspicious",
"attack"
],
"type": "string"
},
"probability": {
"type": "number"
},
"theoremRefs": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"claimBoundary": {
"type": "string"
},
"reviewPriority": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object"
}
},
"recommendedAction": {
"enum": [
"allow",
"sanitize",
"reject",
"escalate"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explainabilityToken": {
"type": "string"
},
"customerSystemProved": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
}
}Call detect_injection to screen untrusted text or detect_trace_tool_policy to review trace allowlist violations. tools/call requires Authorization: Bearer <api-key>.
Names, descriptions and schemas were written by the server and are shown as data.
Shared addresses on big platforms (Cloudflare, Vercel and the like) put unrelated servers together; those are marked shared_infrastructure. A match is a pivot, not a link between operators.